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Abstract
The main interest of this paper is to propose an individual utility maximization
model to explain the low participation of disabled people. We account for hetero-
geneity of preferences and furthermore time of self caring for disabled individuals is
considered as an argument in the utility function. The hours of work decided by dis-
abled individuals are neither homogeneous (they depend on unknown characteristics)
nor continuous (discrete choice sets). We use data of 4790 households from the Span-
ish Survey of Disability, Personal Autonomy and Dependency and find association
between time of informal care and labour participation and consequently, the choice
between jobs 1.
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The main interest of this paper is to explain both the low participation rate and the small
percentage of disabled people that joins the labour force. To drive it, we propose to develop
an individual utility maximization framework. This model accounts for heterogeneity of
preferences and it considers self-care time for disabled individuals as an argument included
in the individual utility function. The basic idea is that people with some health condi-
tions and taking prescription medications may not be able to work full-time or in shifts
jobs. It is necessary to take into account that disabled people require more time for self-
care than non-disabled people and they have different preferences about time assignations.
According to the Observatory of Disability and Labor Market in Spain (ODISMET), dur-
ing the period of 2008-2009, only 28% of disabled people had a job. This ratio is below the
OECD average, which was 32%. On the contrary, if we look at the participation rate, ac-
cording to the Spanish National Bureau of Statistics (INE), only 36.6% of disabled people
participated in the labour market in that period, about 40 points lower than population
without disability. These facts are a clear challenge to theorists and applied economists to
explain these discrepancies both in terms of participation and employment rates. There is
not only Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) that have an impact on labour integration
but also other variables such as workplace accessibility, education level for disabled people,
etc. Thus, the results obtained in the paper should be of great interest for organizations of
disabled people that are working both to ensure their labour integration and to promote
changes in the employment opportunities for disabled people.
Activity and occupation rates among disabled people are really worrying, so the first
of our goals is to analyse the causes of this low participation. Traditionally, low partici-
pation rates associated with disabled people have been explained from supply side (e.g.,
Livermore et al. (2000)). Not only standard costs in the employment search are important.
People with disabilities often incur in additional costs for transport, rehabilitation, assis-
tance, etc. All those circumstances may reduce their labour participation rate. Disability
may affect participation raising the shadow wage due to economic public transfers related
to disability (Madden (2004)).
Greve (2009), in the report for the Academic Network of European Disability Experts,
pointed out that most countries pursue active strategies to integrate disabled people in
the labour market. However, the success of these policies is not always evaluated. As an
example of legislation, these report highlights the flex-jobs in Denmark that help to make
it possible for people without full-work ability to enter the labour market. Additionally,
Parodi and Scuilli (2008) applying a logit model carried out a labour participation model
in households with disabled persons. In order to increase the income of the households
with disabled members they explained policy recommendations such as the provision of
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care services and structural policies to improve employment.
However, standard approaches in individual maximization utility approach fail to con-
sider several problems that are rather relevant when modeling participation decisions of
disabled people (Schur (2003)). We assume that people with some declared disability
(physical or psychical) need more time to improve their health; that is they have to go
to medical consultations, rehabilitation or do specific exercises with more frequency than
non-disabled people. This requires time, so we think that the preferences in time uses
are different having disabilities or not (see Jones (2008) for a more detailed survey). In-
deed, previous studies consider too simple discrete choice models where, as an outcome,
disabled people plan either not to work or to work a number of hours that is a continuous
function of the offered wages. Unfortunately, other unobservable issues different from the
wage and other individual characteristics in a labour participation model exists, such as
location, accessibility or flexibility of the job. This set of unknown characteristics can
create discontinuities in the labour supply and desired working hours will not depend only
on offered wages, but also in those non-observed factors of each job-type that affect the
utility function for disabled people.
In this paper, we consider a more general model where the heterogeneity in preferences
between individuals is included. We suppose that individuals are not free to choose the
working hours because labour markets are rigid. They only can choose between jobs which
are seen as sets of several characteristics, one of which is effectively the timetable. Then, in
order to allow for discreteness in labour supply functions we propose to use the framework
developed in Dagsvik (1994)2. During the last few years, this approach and its extensions
have been increasingly popular as in Van Soest (1995), who offers an alternative approach
in which the number of working hours were discretised and the error term was supposed to
have an extreme value distribution. Assuming random utility maximization, he obtained
the multinomial logit model (see McFadden (1984)). The same idea was proposed in a
different framework, for nurses, (e.g.,Saether (2004) and Di Tommaso et al. (2009)) or for
married women (Aaberge et al. (1999) and Dagsvik and Strom (2006)). Also, for married
women, Aaberge (1995) used simulation techniques to build the choice set.
An additional problem that the previous models present when dealing with disabled peo-
ple’s behaviour is that one may end up using empirical models where the decision of
participation or not in the labour market is considered at the same level as the individ-
ual’s decision on their labour supply. In statistical and empirical studies these models are
specified as multinomial logit ones and in order to implement inference, it is necessary to
assume the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property (IIA). Unfortunately, we be-
2He proposed a discrete choice framework in which the agent’s choice problem is based on the choice
among feasible jobs and the distribution of desired working hours is discrete due to the choice opportunities
distribution.
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lieve that in these models, this assumption is not correct because some of the alternatives
are more closely related than others. Hence, to solve it we propose using the so-called
nested logit model where the individual decision is divided in two steps. In the first one,
individuals maximize their utility by choosing to participate or not in the labour market
while in the second one, they choose their ideal job type conditioned on participation.
We use data from the Spanish Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and Dependency
Situations (2008). This survey is the most recent source of information about disability
in Spain having detailed information about disabled people and their families.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a presentation of our ap-
proach applying a random utility model, detailing the specification (based on supply side),
the method and variables used. Then, we present the empirical results and we conclude
summarizing the main findings, policy implications and possible directions for further
research.
2 Methods
Let Un(Gi, tci, bi) be the utility function for a disabled person n, choosing the job-alternative
i. Here i = 1 if there is no participation, i = 2 if working full-time, i = 3 if working part-
time and i = 4 if working shift job (includes both long-term night shifts and work schedules
in which employees change or rotate shifts). Besides, G is the disposable income corre-
sponding to job i, tc is the time per day devoted to informal care (such as rehabilitation,
doing exercise, tidiness...) for the disabled person in this alternative, and bi are other
characteristics conforming the job type. For given working hours, the budget constraint
for a household is defined as:
Gi = f(whi, I) (1)
where hi is the working time associated with job i, w is the wage per hour and I is
the non-labour income for disabled people, which also includes the wages of the rest of
the household members and other income. f(.) is a general function which describes the
transformation of gross income into after-tax income and s are some characteristics of the
disabled person. We also know that time is limited so, hi + tci = T .
Traditionally, theoretical models of utility assumed that all nonmarket time was leisure,
Li, but nowadays there is a huge body of literature extending the first proposal of Becker
(1965) focusing on other time uses (such as housework time, childcare time or as is our
case cares time) denoted by ti. Therefore, in economic models including time allocations
we need to realise that time is limited, so that it also exits a time restriction, as we show
in our manuscript. In this regard, following the seminal paper of Grossman (1972) and
the posterior extension of ? to a lifecycle investment framework, health can be considered
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a capital stock which is subject a depreciation over time. These authors suggested that
people may produce their own health by using resources and time. Thus, some practices
such as doing exercise, rehabilitationare time consuming activities but are also associated
with a better health. Then, health is a consumption good because increase the utility of
individuals and also an inversion good because increase their productivity. The investment
in health depends on actual status of health, so is logical to think that this investment
has to be increased with age or when health is worse like in the case of disabled or peo-
ple with limitations. Hence, Grossman’s model is then especially useful when studying
disabled people, for whom the time investment in cares to maintain good health is really
important. In that sense, there exists some studies, as is our case, focusing on activities
such as medical care or personal self-care Ettner et al. (2009). More recently, Mazzocchi
and Traill (2011) also include factors affecting health in the utility function. In this sense,
and taking into account that we are studying disabled people, we consider that Health is a
function of the time devoted to cares. What we meant is that more time affects positively
the health, so it is a source of welfare. Then, it is more valuable for those with worst
health because they need to invest more time for improving it and also for older people.
Besides Kyung et al. (2013) also specified health as a function of informal care.
The omission of leisure time in our model is partly due to the difficulty in separating
care time and leisure for disabled people, taking into account the large number of border-
line cases. A similar point of view was assumed in 15, where it is pointed out the difficulty
of separating leisure and child-care using as borderline case the time for playing with a
child in the case of married women. Because we do not observe all variables affecting the
preferences, we assume the utility function to be random, thus;
Un(Gi, tci, bi; s) = vn(Gi, tci; s) + ε(bi). (2)
Where i ∈ J [J=1, 2, 3, 4] and bi ∈ B [B=b1, b2, b3, b4].
v(.) is a positive deterministic function and ε(bi) is a random component for unobserved
characteristics that affect the utility assumed to be independent and identically extreme
value distributed with a probability distribution function such as:
Pr(ε(bi) ≤ x) = e−e
−x
. (3)
We will assume that individual n makes an election because the job-alternative chosen, i
, maximizes its utility given other characteristics, that is:
Un(Gi, tci, bi; s) > Un(Gj , tcj , bj ; s) i, j ∈ J. (4)
Due to preferences not completely known to us, the best we can do in simulating the be-
haviour of a disabled person is to calculate the probability of choosing a job type category,
given the characteristics and the available alternatives3. The probability that individual
3For more details of this type of modeling see Dagsvik and Strom (2004)
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n chooses job-type i, would be:
P (Un|Gi, tci, bi; s) = maxj∈JUn(Gj , tcj , bj ; s). (5)
Given the assumed probability distribution for the error term, we will get the multinomial
logit model.
P (Un|Gi, tci, bi; s)) =
exp(vn((Gi, tci, bi; s))∑J
j=i exp(vn((Gj , tcj , bj ; s))
. (6)
This model, which is the most commonly used assumes that the choice from a given set
of alternatives satisfies the IIA. This property implies that random elements in utility are
independent across alternatives and identically distributed. IIA property avoids including
heterogeneity in preferences and correlation between alternatives. Those impositions may
result too restrictive in our study, in which three of the alternatives are referred to labour
participation and the other one not, so we are going to relax it. Thus, we construct
a two level model with a degenerate branch; the upper level is a participation and non-
participation nest, while the lower level is composed of the three kind of jobs corresponding
to the participation nest. Then,
Un(J = i|p,Gi, tci, bi; s) = Un(p|Gj , tcj , bj ; s) + Un(J = i|p,Gi, tci, bi; s). (7)
In a first step, the disabled person choose to belong to a nest m from two available (to
participate in labour market, p or not, p0). For evaluating this first choice, they compare
w∗, which is the shadow price of the time out of the market with market wage. This
shadow time is non-observable to us but we observe that when w∗ > w there is no par-
ticipation (m′ = p0). Consequentially, the household would choose alternative i = 1, but
if w∗ ≤ w then they participate (m′ = p), then choose the alternative which maximizes
the utility from i = 2, 3, 4. Then they have, as a starting point, two possible solutions: a
corner (i = 1 ∈ p0) and a three interior ones (i = 2, 3, 4 ∈ p).
In the nested model we need to add an additional parameter to the joint distribution
of the error terms in each nest, λm. This parameter represents a measure of the correla-
tion of the random components of the alternatives belonging to that nest. So that, the
utilities are re-scaled by the inverse of the mentioned dissimilarity parameter, λm attached
to an index variable called Inclusive Value (IV) which is defined by a set of utility expres-
sions associated with a partitioned set of alternatives. That idea lies in the grouping of
similar alternatives into nests and thus creating a hierarchical structure of those alterna-
tives (Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (2003)). In our case, the IV for the nest
implying participation, p (IVp) is defined as:
IVp = λp = Ln
∑
j∈p
evnj/λp = Ln[e(vn2/λp)+exp(vn3/λp)+exp(vn4/λp)]. (8)
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Then, the probability that a person chooses an alternative can be written as:
P (J = i|i ∈ p,Gi, tci, bi; s) = (9)
=




j=2 exp(vnj|p(f(whj , I), tcj , bj ; s)/λp∑




j=2 exp(vnk|p(f(whk, I), tck, bk; s)/λm′
×
exp(vni|p(f(whi, I), tci, bi; s)/λp∑4
j=2 exp(vnj|p(f(whj , I), tcj , bj ; s)/λp
.
We must take into account that we have a degenerate branch. It means that the IV for
the non participation is 1. If the property of IIA is satisfied, our model could be simplified
to a multinomial logit.
2.1 Model Specification and Estimation Procedure.
The deterministic part of the utility function requires choosing a functional form, but
this choice is not imposed directly by economic theory so it is usually determined by the
data. The common approach in this context is to find a flexible family of parametric or
semi-parametric specifications. Dagsvik and Strom (2006) demonstrate that under general
regularity conditions, the systematic part of the utility function can have a form, similar
to;







Where β(sn) = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3
The explicative variables included in our study are: x1 = Age, x2 = 1 if the person
with disability is a man and x3 = Limitation grade of the person with disability. We also
assume that vn(G, tc; s) is additive separable in income and care time and each utility
component is supposed to have a Box-Cox functional form. In that sense, we take the
advantage of having an specification which is globally concave. For the utility function to
be quasi-concave, we require αG < 1 and αtc < 1. Note that if αG → 0 and αtc → 0, the
utility function converges to a log-linear function.
This model could be estimated sequentially but there is a considerable loss of informa-
tion resulting in inefficient estimation, (see 18). So, we use the full-information maximum






δn(J = i)log[P (J = i/Gi, tci, s, β, λ]. (11)
Where n = 1, ..., N are observations, i ∈ J are the available alternatives, λ is the param-
eter estimated for the inclusive value, s are the exogenous attributes and β their utility
parameters. δn(J = i) = 1 if the alternative i is chosen and zero otherwise.
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2.2 Data
The available surveys on disability in Spain cover most of the needs for information of dis-
ability, dependency, ageing and the population health4. People with disability is defined
as those who reported to have at least a deficiency; that does not always imply having
limitations on the development of daily activities.
According to the Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and Dependency Situations
2008, in Spain, of the 7.4 million old people (more than 65 years old), 2,227,500 declared
a disability in 2008, representing the 30.3%. The overall disability rate stands at 8.5%,
with an absolute value of 3,847,900 people with disabilities, of which 1,547,300 are men
(40%) and 2,300,500 women (60%). It should be noted that the age range in which most
people with disabilities fall are between 55 and 64 years (14.18% of the total).
4Three surveys have been carried out: the Survey on Disabilities, Deficiencies and Disabilities
(EDDM1986), the Survey on Disabilities, Deficiencies and State of Health (EDDS1999) and the Survey on
Disability, Personal Autonomy and Dependency Situations 2008.
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Table 1: Main results of the Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and
Dependency Situations 2008.
Total Survey
Total Sample. Households 96075
People who answered the questionnaire 22795
People with limitations who answered the ques-
tionnaire
14706
People with limitations who have a job 1632
People with limitations who work :
How did you find your current job?
41.4% Friends/Family; 22.9% Firm recruitment;
2.62% public service of employment; 1.15% disabil-
ity association
People with limitations. Are you looking for a
job? (<65 years old)
10.16 % (610)
Why do you think you cant find a job? 43.65 % (of the 10.16 %) for the disability
Why don’t you look for a job? 23.85% think it is difficult because of the disability;
50 % can’t work
Do you feel discrimination in your job due to
your disability?
9.42 %
Do you feel discrimination when you are look-
ing for a job?
20.8 %
Source: Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and Dependency Situations 2008.
From the 14.706 individuals with limitations that answered the questionnaire (about dis-
abilities) only 1632 were workers. Usually, the idea is that having a disability makes the
individual not capable for any kind of work. This is totally unfounded and a true effort
is necessary to match their capabilities with the labour market opportunities. We have
restricted the 22795 disabled individuals for those with ages between 16 and 65. 5
5In Spain there is a law based on the integration of Disabled People. This law of Social Integration
of disabled people 13/1982 of the 7th of April (LISMI) established that for private and public firms with
more than 50 workers, it was compulsory to hire at least a 2% of disabled people. Despite the existence
of this regulations, there are very few companies that fulfill the obligation. According to the Academic
Network of European Disability Experts, in Spain only 14% of business larger than 50 workers meet the
requirements in 2008
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Table 2: Frequencies for each type of job depending on level of limitations.(%)






Non Participation 52.02 81.49 71.02 30.4
Full-Time Job 40.1 15.35 23.47 58.72
Part-Time Job 6.22 2.66 4.6 8.4
Shifts 1.6 0.4 0.9 2.4
Size 19160 3308 6032 9820
Source: Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and Dependency Situations 2008.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (Means)






Age (Years) 50.8 52.19 52.57 49.25
Chronic Illness (Binary) 0.78 0.85 0.83 0.73
Male (Binary) 0.65 0.60 0.54 0.73
Working (Binary) 0.48 0.185 0.29 0.69
Time of Cares (Hours
per day)
2.42 4.45 1.46 2.34
Size 19160 3308 6032 9820
Source: Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and Dependency Situations 2008.
These figures show the low participation between disabled people, specially for those with
more limitations. About the 18% of people with limitations is working while this percent-
age is the 69% if the disable individual has no limitation. Also significant is the difference
in the number of hours per day devoted to cares, which is the double in case of having
severe limitations.
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Disposable Income 0.344*** 0.080 4.29
αG -1.19
Care Time -2.409*** 0.210 -11.421
αtc 0.40
Non-participation
Age 0.089*** 0.005 17.576
Gender -0.268* 0.157 -1.702
Limitation -0.827*** 0.088 -9.408
Full-time job
Age 0.035*** 0.006 5.314
Gender 0.239 0.226 1.059
Limitation 0.417*** 0.119 3.481
Part-time job
Age 0.011 0.007 1.578
Gender 0.336 0.249 1.350
Limitation 0.241* 0.131 1.836
λp 0.669*** 0.059 11.290
Number of Observations 19160
R2 0.287
Source: Authors’ elaboration from the Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and
Dependency Situations 2008.
*** Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level and * Significance at 10% level.
3 Results
The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the parameters of the nested logit
model 6. Tables 4 and 5 report the estimated parameters of the utility function according
to the final specification of the model. For the nested logit model, we also report the
estimate of λp and its standard deviation.
The parameters αG and αtc are estimated to yield a quasi-concave utility function,
both of them being less than 1 (-1.19 and 0.40 respectively). The results show a positive
sign of the disposable income as we expected, because more income in the household is
associated with higher utility. Then, they would prefer jobs reporting more earnings if all
other factors are similar.
6We also estimate a multinomial logit in order to compare these two models
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We have tested other taste-modifying variables but we have selected those having more sig-
nificant effects on preference for care time, and those were related with theoretical findings.
Care time has a negative sign, that is, as more time is devoted to care, less is the utility
in the alternative chosen. This is related with the results obtained by Van den Berg et
al.20, who found an overall negative correlation between care hours and well-being (util-
ity).7 The positive sign for age shows a preference for care time when the age increases.
Thus, people with disabilities prefer jobs which allow more care time when they get older8.
Non-participation is preferred to shift-work (base category) for older people, women and
more limited people. As the individuals are less limited, they would prefer jobs allowing
shorter care time. People with more level of limitation would have more preference for
care time and prefer jobs that could allow that dedication. We also provide an estimate of
McFadden’s goodness of fit measure, which indicated that the model fits quite well. Most
of variables are individually significant and the model is globally significant too.
7That can be explained by the direct relation between that variable and the poor health status that
reduce welfare. It allows for less time for social relations and maybe more stress, causing less utility for
the household in every alternative chosen.
8This may be caused by the fact that disabilities are more frequent in advanced ages and care time is
more valued.
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Disposable Income 2.596*** 0.403 6.442
Care Time -2.521*** 0.200 -12.557
Non-participation
Age 0.095*** 0.006 15.011
Gender -0.192 0.208 -0.922
Limitation -0.770*** 0.112 -6.829
Full-time job
Age 0.036*** 0.006 5.914
Gender 0.258 0.209 1.238
Limitation 0.391*** 0.110 3.546
Part-time job
Age 0.006 0.007 0.925
Gender 0.381* 0.238 1.603
Limitation 0.246** 0.125 1.967
Number of Observations 4790
R2 0.270
Source: Authors’ elaboration from the Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and
Dependency Situations 2008.
*** Significance at 1% level, **Significance at 5% level and * Significance at 10% level.
Table 5 presents the results of multinomial logistic regression on job choices. As we ob-
serve, the results are similar to before. Working part or full time is preferred to working
shifts for men, for those who have moderate or no limitation and also for those who are
older. On the other hand, non-participation is preferred to shift-work if the individual is
old, but is less preferred if the person has less limitations. Men also prefer to participate,
even if it meant shift-work, rather than not participate.
We carried out the test developed by Hausman and McFadden (1984) to test the va-
lidity of the IIA assumption and we have to reject the null hypothesis of the IIA property.
Then, the relevant model is not the multinomial logit model but the nested model. The
degree of independence in unobserved utility among the upper nest is estimated to 0.67.
Thus, our model satisfies the necessary condition in that it must be between 0 and 1. The
parameter is not 1 and corroborates our hypotheses that the nested logit model is better
than the multinomial logit one.
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Disposable Income 5.77 (1.26) 5.25 (1.30) 5.22 (1.16) 5.27 (1.16)
Care Time 1.01 (0.56) 0.96 (0.59) 1.00 (0.60) 0.88 (0.60)
Age 54.85 (32.41) 45.76 (29.65) 46.82 (29.10) 45.70 (31.42)
Gender 0.58 (0.66) 0.70 (0.66) 0.75 (0.66) 0.68 (0.46)
Limitation 2.02 (1.42) 2.58 (1.69) 2.52 (1.73) 2.71 (1.82)
Source: Authors’ elaboration from the Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and
Dependency Situations 2008.
Table 6 show a pondered average of the parameters of the utility function. Each attribute
is weighted by the percentage of choices of that alternative and then all values from each
alternative are summed up to obtain the average. People with disability who choose shift-
work are on average, the youngest. That result is logical with our intuition because this
kind of job is less flexible and requires more effort than the others.
We consider that the results referred to care time are reasonable. People who devote
more time to care chose non-participation more frequently. This alternative is followed
by part-time jobs which also allow more time out of the labour market. We argue that
conciliation between personal and professional life is more difficult for people undertaking
shift-work or full-time jobs, and that is reflected in the data (people who choose to work
shifts have the lowest figure of care time, 0.88). On average, people with more limitations
(2.02) choose the non-participation alternative and contrarily, people working shifts are
those having the minimum level (2.71) (remember the level 3 implies the less limitative).
For each observation we predict the job status for the person with disability in order
to be the one having the highest estimated probability, and we calculate the number of
observations for which the predicted status is equal to the actual status. In that sense,
the results obtained about the prediction power of the model are encouraging.
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Table 7: Job-specific elasticities
Type of job Total effect (increase in in-
come)
Total effect (increase in care
time)
















Source: Authors’ elaboration from the Survey on Disability, Personal Autonomy and De-
pendency Situations 2008.
Our estimates suggest that policy makers have several tools to affect these choice vari-
ables, such as social policies and firms grants, to improve labour supply of people with
disabilities changing their decisions. We note that when the income level related with non-
participation increases by 1% the decision probability of this alternative increases about
0.7% . The higher increase in the probability to choose an alternative associated with
an income increment is the referent to shift-work. When the income associated with this
alternative is raised by 1%, then the probability of choice for that type of job increases by
1.56%.
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4 Discussion and Conclusion
We have estimated a job-type model on Spanish data for a sample of households where
a person with disability lives. Our approach differs from previous research because as
far as we know, it is the first time that a model of labour supply for disabled people is
estimated regarding job-types as a set enclosing several factors. Besides, the performance
gains of our approach over previous studies is based on disabled people need more time
for health care than people without disability and can affect their decisions. We suppose
that a person with disability can require support or assistance for basic living activities
and it varies depending on the age, individual needs, lifestyle and other circumstances
which sometimes detract them from participating in the labour market. Consistent with
this objective, we have carried out a discrete choice labour supply model in which con-
ditioning on their participation in the labour market, they face a set of choices of their
”job-alternatives”. Therefore, a choice between participating or not is presented and af-
terwards, another between working in a full-time, part-time job or to work shifts.
By learning from the past and looking into the future, our approach has allowed us to
learn about one important feature: an overall income increase seems to enhance the prob-
ability of working shifts and shows that non participation is the least flexible choice. Care
time is more valuable with age and limitation-level, affecting the choice decisions about
labour activities. This should not be very surprising in the model given that individuals
are rational and have to choose between a set of job-packages that may not be as flexible
as they want. Thus, policy makers should aim to try and connect older people and those
with limitations with more flexible jobs which respect their care needs.
This paper clearly shows that a generalist policy against some types of jobs which could
be undesirable in the overall population. People with disability have special needs and
in most cases require more flexible jobs. Not only but offering telecommuting may be a
good option for disabled people to develop their capabilities and competencies. Hence, it
is necessary to promote policies for support in addressing the accommodation needs for
disabled people, and consequently promoting their wellbeing. : In this sense, specific firms
management and job placement agencies could help to overcome the existent barriers, be-
ing more flexible to establish a reasonable schedule for disabled people.
To sum up, further work is needed to evaluate health-care for people with disability and
promote their hiring in more flexible jobs. All these issues requires more research in the
future but this paper is a good start to undertake it.
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